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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK Defence Standardization (DStan) is the 
0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH¶V02'FHQWUHIRU³throughlife 
standardization and its management across defence´
[https://www.contracts.mod.uk/defence-standards/]. 
Currently DStan manages a portfolio of circa 900 
standards. As well as maintaining an up-to-date rele-
vant portfolio through the addition, revision and re-
moval of standards, DStan also offers other services, 
such as advice and support to project teams on the 
selection of standards within activities throughout 
the Concept, Assessment, Demonstration, Manufac-
ture, In-service and Disposal (CADMID) cycle.  For 
more details about the responsibilities of DStan 
please see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-defence-
standardization.  
DStan contributes to standardization policy-
setting for international defence organisations, such 
as NATO and the European Defence Association 
(EDA). More generally, MOD staff participate in 
committees responsible for the development and re-
visions of civil standards, such as those maintained 
in the UK by the British Standards Institute (BSI). 
These will include dependability (i.e. reliability, 
availability, maintenance and maintainability) but 
the scope of standards is broad and includes man-
agement processes (e.g. for safety) and technology 
standards (e.g. materials). 
Recently DStan has adopted a policy towards 
standardization which it lDEHOV³as civil as possible, 
as military as necessary´ 6HH IRU H[DPSOH
[https://www.contracts.mod.uk/announcements/uk-
defence-standardization-dstan/] for details of a call 
to civil standards organisations to apply for a gov-
ernment license in this respect. This policy has 
emerged in response to the changes in structure and 
composition of the UK MOD and the Defence In-
dustry, as well as in light of evolving technological 
challenges and opportunities. Thus, the MOD are in-
creasingly considering the use of civilian standards 
where possible and only use Defence Standards 
when absolutely necessary. This raises challenges in 
establishing the suitability of civil standards in a mil-
itary environment. There are examples such as man-
agement standards which might be transferable, but 
there are other examples such as for some technolo-
gies where the usage stress levels and profiles might 
differ substantially between civil and military use. 
This policy also initiates change within the DStan 
organisation itself since its historical role needs to 
adapt to managing this larger and more complex 
standards portfolio. In particular, the nature of the 
advice provided to project teams is changing since 
not only is it important to select appropriate stand-
ards for contracts, tests and so on, but the conse-
quences of using an inappropriate standard can be 
costly. Thus, DStan is in transition from an organiza-
tion that viewed itself to a large degree as a reposito-
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ry of knowledge and information specific to the mili-
tary context, to positioning itself as a service provid-
er. However, understanding the value of the service 
that DStan may provide, is inherently linked to the 
added value of the standards they offer. Demonstrat-
ing this added value is very challenging.  
To support a standards organization like DStan, a 
rigorous and defendable method is required to help 
users select appropriate standards. The purpose of 
such a method would be to enable project managers 
to become intelligent users of standards and identify 
the most appropriate standard (if any) to adopt on a 
given project.  
The aim of this paper is to develop a method 
through which those users selecting standards for a 
particular project purpose can assess the trade-offs 
they are making when selecting one candidate stand-
ard over another. For example, candidate standards 
might be a civil standard, a modified civil standard 
(e.g. with additional annex for military environ-
ment), or a defence standard). Different standards 
will typically provide different levels of confidence 
about the performance of the system under opera-
tional conditions, and hence the decision for one 
VWDQGDUGKDVVLPLODULWLHVWRD³YDOXHRILQIRUPDWLRQ´
decision problem.  
To achieve our aim, we have identified and de-
veloped a method based on a graphical decision 
model to help users understand the value of different 
standards on a given project to procure a new de-
fence product.   
In the remainder of this paper, we position our 
work relative to the wider literature on standardiza-
tion in Section 2. In Section 3 we describe the prin-
ciples of our method, while in Section 4 we describe 
a case study to evaluate and develop the proposed 
method and discuss what we have learnt through this 
implementation. The case study is real although de-
tails have been de-sensitised in our description of the 
model developed. Future developments of the mod-
elling tool and additional research required are dis-
cussed in Section 5. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There appears to be no literature that addresses 
the problem posed in this paper; that is modelling to 
provide guidance on the adoption and selection of 
standards in general to meet the purpose of the spe-
cific use application. There are journal articles that 
refer to the relevance and use of particular standards 
for a specific purpose. For example, Leitch (2009), 
Purdy (2010), Aven (2011) in relation to ISO 31000 
for risk management and Braband and Griebel 
(2004) in relation to IEC 61508 for functional safety.  
Such papers tend to examine a particular standard 
from through either the lens of its core principles or 
by reflecting upon experience of implementation 
within a particular organization setting. The chal-
lenge addressed in this papers includes standards for 
risk, safety, reliability and maintenance but is not re-
stricted to these domains.  
More generally, Timmermann and Epstein, 
(2010) have observed that that since standards tend 
to be defined for a wide community and are hence 
generic, then challenges emerge for organizations as 
they manage adopt within their particular context. 
This has implications for our context since defence 
standards are developed to reflect UK military use 
and are widely used by industry when developing 
products or services for the MOD. Therefore if the 
MOD make greater use of civil standards, which are 
not designed specifically for military use then they 
may not meet MOD requirements. This implies that 
either the MOD accepts this risk or places additional 
effort tailoring civil standards to bring them to a lev-
el that is suitable for the defence context 
Historically, standards have been viewed as limit-
ing innovation in products and processes. For exam-
ple, Arthur (1989) and Katz and Shapiro (1992) all 
discuss the role of standards in restricting innova-
tion.  However, more recently greater consideration 
has been given to understanding how standards can 
be and have been used to promote innovation. For 
example, Blind (2013), Swann (2000), Swann 
(2010), and Narayann and Chen (2012) discuss how 
innovation has been promoted and facilitated 
through the use of standards, although they also rec-
ognize the dis-benefits of standardization in their at-
tempts to provide a balanced, critical analysis.  
These papers, and related work of the authors, have 
been based data collected from panel surveys, com-
pany cases, literature reviews, economic modelling 
and sociological analysis. Amongst the reported pos-
itive influences of standardization on innovation are 
the following; adverse selection of options; econo-
mies of scale; creating environment of trust; effi-
ciency in supply chains; and reducing transactional 
costs. While negative effect on innovation from the 
use of standards include: UDLVLQJULYDO¶VFRVWV; reduc-
ing choice; and prematurely selecting technology so-
lutions before markets mature.  Recent conference 
papers by Tasker et al., (2014a,b) specifically dis-
cuss the need to encourage innovation in within the 
framework of through-life engineering services, a 
context relevant to the MOD and the defence indus-
try, through the development and use of service 
standards. That is, Tasker et al (2014a,b) propose 
moving away from technical standards on materials, 
to develop framework standards on how to use 
equipment or create value from equipment. While 
we agree that process based standards, including 
those focusing on the integration of the engineering 
products and services, are important, we do not 
agree that there should be a move away from tech-
nical standards.  To the contrary, many technical 
standards are vital to support the development of 
safe and reliable products that can be maintained 
through life.  Indeed it is particularly the technical 
standards that are of most interest from our model-
ling perspective since these are the ones in which the 
differences between the military and civil contexts 
are important risk sources and hence where choices 
need to be made in their selection and implementa-
tion. 
3 MODELLING METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the methodology adopted 
for our decision model to evaluate the impact of se-
lecting candidate standards for a defence procure-
ment project. Throughout we refer to the procure-
ment of systems and we use this term to encompass 
everything from small pieces of equipment to sub-
assemblies and complex systems. 
3.1 Model requirements  
The model selection criteria have been developed 
in collaboration with MOD Requirements Managers. 
These are the managers who are responsible for se-
lecting the standards to be used during the system 
procurement process. The Requirements Managers 
have relevant experience applicable to a range of 
typical defence procurement projects and so we be-
lieve that the criteria defined are generalizable with-
in our context. 
Through discussions with the Requirements Man-
agers we have been able to articulate the challenges 
affecting the selection of a suitable standard during 
defence system procurement. These challenges are as 
follows.  First, understanding the dependency be-
tween the overall system requirement, the standard 
selection and the successful outcome of the pro-
curement project, typically defined as timely, afford-
able and to specification. Second, articulating the 
different consequences of selecting a standard in re-
lation to the desired outcome. Third, understanding 
the impact of observing sources of data on the likeli-
hood of being able to procure an effective system. 
Finally, capturing the uncertainty inherent in all as-
pects of selecting a standard and so procuring the 
system.  
Our modelling methodology must be capable of 
addressing these challenges. In particular, our chosen 
model type should be capable of the following in re-
lation to the third and fourth challenges. First, cap-
turing uncertainty and dependencies between ran-
dom variables. Second, estimating the likelihood of 
a parameter of interest being in a given state based 
on all available data and knowledge. In addition, 
through discussion with the Requirements Managers 
it was surfaced that it would be beneficial if the 
modelling methodology support engagement with 
managers and other stakeholders across a variety of 
project contexts and types of standards. This sug-
gests that being able to create a graphical representa-
tion of the decision problem to provide an intuitive 
way to visualise dependencies and to structure a 
problem would be desirable. It is also important that 
our modelling method be comprehendible and usable 
by the practitioners who regularly use and apply 
standards. 
3.2 Bayesian belief network model class 
Following the above considerations, we decided 
that the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) modelling 
approach should be evaluated as the basis of our 
methodology. This is because BBNs can be highly 
effective means of modelling to reason through rela-
tionships which are highly uncertain and this model 
class has all the characteristics described above to 
fulfil the Requirements Managers criteria.  
Determining the value of a standard within a pro-
curement project is complex and likely to require 
multiple dependent factors to be modelled in a struc-
tured and transparent manner. Further, BBN and 
their natural extensions called Influence Diagrams 
(ID) allow us to formally represent not only the un-
certainties associated with random variables, but al-
so to explicate the decision variables (e.g. which 
standard?) and the valuations (e.g. consequences of 
selecting a given standard to achieve purpose). 
For brevity, the theoretical foundations of BBNs 
and IDs are not discussed here. Pearl (1998) pro-
vides a foundational text, while Fenton and Neil 
(2012) provide descriptions of the principles and the 
applications of BBN and ID models.   
In summary, the structure of a BBN comprises of 
two key elements; nodes and arrows. Nodes repre-
sent uncertain variables while the arrows represent 
causal or influential links between nodes. The direc-
tion of the arrow represents the direction of influ-
ence. Each node and arrow contains probabilistic in-
formation, either as marginal probability 
distributions or conditional probability distributions.  
Typically the term BBN is used for models that only 
contains random nodes. A BBN can be generalized 
to be an ID model by including decision nodes and 
consequence nodes. Decision nodes are represented 
by a square and where included in the model, they 
can be used to identify the optimal decision. Conse-
quence (or value or utility) is represented by a hexa-
gon. These nodes capture the value of different out-
comes and are used to model aspects such as cost of 
testing, whole life cost, etc. 
BBN/IDs have features that make them appealing 
for assessing the value of different standards. First, 
the BBN/ID uses graphical tools to qualitatively 
structure the problem. Those who regularly use 
BBNs and IDs, or other similar visualizations, be-
lieve that it promotes effective communication be-
tween decision makers and experts, and that it im-
proves the credibility of the model. Second, 
BBNs/IDs are based on strong mathematical founda-
tions providing a theoretically robust and consistent 
method of combining multiple sources of infor-
mation. Third, future decision makers will be able to 
understand the justification for previous decisions if 
the qualitative and quantitative information has been 
elicited in a transparent manner. This was raised as 
an important feature during our initial discussions 
with practitioners.   
3.3 Model building process 
One potential limitation with adopting a BBN/ID 
approach is the resource required to develop the 
model. Stakeholder involvement and support is re-
quired to develop a meaningful model and to popu-
late it with, for example, probabilistic data, valua-
tions as well as defining the set of decisions. 
However the level of involvement required of stake-
holders will depend upon the complexity of the 
problem being explored and the availability of data.  
To address this potential limitation and ensure re-
source demands on project teams involved in model 
development are reasonable, we have designed a one 
day workshop with relevant stakeholders to structure 
the ID model, This workshop has been implemented 
as part of a case study to build an initial qualitative 
model to evaluate the value of different standards for 
a particular piece of equipment for which this was a 
topical issue.  
In terms of system scale, the equipment of interest 
for the case study is at the less complex end although 
it is a vital item for which extensive testing was re-
quired to military standards.  The choice of a simpler 
system for the initial case has been deliberate to de-
velop a prototype model that can be challenged and 
adapted for a wider class of system in due course.  
4 CASE STUDY 
The aim of the case study is twofold. Firstly, to 
evaluate the modelling methodology in terms of its 
potential as a tool to support MOD Requirements 
Managers understand the impact of selecting differ-
ent standards. Secondly, to help structure the 
knowledge and thinking of the Requirements Man-
ager through the process of developing the ID model 
and so qualitatively support his/her decision making 
process. 
4.1 System characteristics and context 
The case study focused on the procurement of a 
simple system ± analogous to personal protective 
equipment. In procuring the new generation of this 
type of system, the MOD have the opportunity to 
buy and use an alternative system from the system 
family currently in use. However, as the alternative 
system was tested to different standards than the UK 
MOD norm, there was uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of adopting the alternative equipment.  
For this particular case study, the project team 
sought to procure new equipment and define what 
standards to use as part of their requirements defini-
tion process. The project team were reluctant to re-
use previous standards without fully understanding 
the consequences, especially when alternative stand-
ards or options were available to them. 
The focus of the case study has been to develop a 
modelling structure to allow the Requirements Man-
ager to understand the impact of selecting different 
standards. The structuring was facilitated during the 
one day workshop with members of the project team.  
Namely the Requirements Manager and two Subject 
Matter Experts (SME).   
4.2 Workshop design 
The workshop was facilitated by two of the au-
thors and was split into two parts. During the morn-
ing session, which lasted approximately three hours, 
the two SME and the Requirements Manager dis-
cussed the differences between each of the standards 
options, including what they impacted upon. The fa-
cilitators began this process by understanding the 
different decisions available to the Requirements 
Manager. This was followed by understanding the 
consequence of these decisions. Through this, the 
different valuations, and hence expression of utili-
ties, and the uncertainties that impact these utilities 
were identified.  
Following the morning session, the facilitators 
structured the information gathered into an ID mod-
el.  During the afternoon session the modelling struc-
ture was explained and the SMEs validated the struc-
ture. The different variables were explained together 
with the structure of the network. Based on feed-
back, modifications were made to the structure 
where appropriate. 
Here we discuss the three different types of varia-
bles in the model and what they represent and influ-
ence.  
4.3 Decisions 
During the workshop discussions, two different 
decisions available to the Requirements Manager 
were identified. The Requirements Manager must 
choose whether or not to use a standard, and if so, 
which standard to adopt. In addition, the Require-
ments Manager is responsible for determining the 
system requirements, and can influence how strict 
these are. These decisions must be made in parallel 
as the Requirements Manager does not want to select 
a system requirement that is incompatible or con-
flicts with a chosen standard. Thus the model in-
cludes the two decision nodes; Choice of Standard, 
and System Requirement. For this case, this included 
a Defence Standard, two UK Civil standards and no 
standard.  
4.4 Uncertainties 
The project team believed that there were a num-
ber of factors influenced by the choice of standards 
and the system requirement. Firstly, they believed 
that the different choices of standard available to 
them influenced factors related to the test. This is 
because alternative standards proposed more (or 
less) tests to be carried out and passed to demon-
strate conformity. Secondly, the tests had different 
characteristics, such as stress levels and profiles, 
them that gave the team varying degrees of confi-
dence that the system would be tested under condi-
tions that allowed them to make reasonable infer-
ences about performance under representative 
operational use conditions.  
Differences between the standards included type 
of pre-conditioning (e.g. none, some), degree of 
damage (e.g. functioning, failure) and the allowable 
inactive period between consecutive tests (e.g. the 
duration between shocks imposed to stress the sys-
tem). Depending upon the states of these three varia-
bles, the team believed it was more or less likely that 
the test was representative of operational conditions.  
From this discussion five different uncertain vari-
ables were created. Namely: Number of Tests; Pre-
Conditioning; Degree of Damage; Period between 
Tests; and Operational representativeness.  
The team also believed that the choice of stand-
ards would impact on the probability of the system 
being interoperable, Interoperability has been inter-
preted very broadly as the ability of the equipment to 
be used in conjunction n within both UK forces and 
international coalition partners. Thus interoperability 
is important for military systems given the nature of 
their operational use. Military standards were con-
sidered more likely to produce interoperable equip-
ment when compared with the options of using civil 
standards or no standard.  
The team also stated that they believed the likeli-
hood of the system being exported to other countries 
was impacted by its interoperability. For example, a 
system that has been designed to a NATO standard 
was believed to offer greater potential to a company 
looking to export to other NATO nations than a sys-
tem designed to a UK Defence Standard.  
From the discussions around these two aspects of 
interoperability, two new random variables were 
created. Namely: Interoperability; and Exportability.  
The team further believed that the strictness of the 
system requirement would impact on the operational 
advantage gained by the MOD on using the system. 
The strictness of the system requirements would also 
impact on the probability that the system meets the 
requirements as documented in the so-called System 
Requirements Document (SRD); with more chal-
lenging requirements being less likely to be met.  
Whether or not the equipment meets the SRD clearly 
influences the military advantage the MOD gains 
from use of the system. From this discussion, two 
new variables were created. Namely: Operational 
Advantage; and Equipment meets SRD. Note that 
Equipment meets SRD can be interpreted broadly. 
The SRD documents all the requirements of the sys-
tem, including the system being able to meet per-
formance and safety requirements.  All these features 
may be included within the variable Equipment 
meets SRD. The team believed requirements criteri-
on with priority in this case was safety. However, in 
other cases, this variable may require splitting into 
multiple variables to capture the multiple criteria in 
relation to performance stated in the SRD. Further, 
Operational Advantage was viewed as the system 
being capable of meeting the current military capa-
bilities.  
Finally, the team were interested in the output of 
the tests as this is the only variable which can be tru-
ly observed. A new variable was created; Test Re-
sults, which was influenced by the following three 
variables: Number of Tests; Representative with re-
spect to in-service use; and Equipment meets SRD. 
The logic behind this structure was as follows. If the 
equipment meets the requirement, it is more likely to 
pass the test. If the test is unrepresentative of opera-
tional conditions, then the test is unlikely to identify 
systems that do not meet the requirement. Finally, 
having a small number of tests is also less likely to 
fail poor systems.  
4.5 Consequences 
The team believed that ultimately the decisions 
and uncertainties previously described would impact 
four different financial metrics. These metric repre-
sent the consequences that are to be valued and 
hence represented as the utilities within the model. 
Firstly, the choice of standard would influence the 
upfront or initial procurement costs. Different as-
pects of the test would cost more; e.g. smaller toler-
able levels require more expensive raw material and 
manufacturing methods. Having a larger number of 
tests to carry out would also increase the up-front 
costs.  
Secondly, the team believed that if the system 
was placed in-service (since it passed the test), but it 
was subsequently found to not meet the original re-
quirements or be sufficiently interoperable, then re-
work would have to be carried out. As such, rework 
costs would be incurred in either of these scenarios.  
Thirdly, the team believed that exportability 
would potentially offer the MOD the opportunity to 
recoup costs via export levies imposed on any indus-
try systems that were sold to non-UK parties. If the 
system was exportable, then costs could be recov-
ered in the future.  
Fourthly, the summation of the up-front costs, the 
reworks costs and the export levy would give a 
whole life cost. However, this is not the whole life 
cost of the system, but rather the difference in the 
whole life cost from adopting the alternative stand-
ards.  
Therefore, four different consequence nodes were 
created. Namely: Testing or Procurement Costs; 
Rework Costs; Export Levy; and Whole Life Cost. 
4.6 Decision model for selecting between standards 
 
Figure 1, on the following page, shows the ID 
model developed to capture the relationships be-
tween the uncertainties, the decision nodes and the 
consequences discussed above. 
4.7 Implications of modelling process 
The process of structuring the model encouraged 
a number of issues to be discussed by the team dur-
ing the workshop. In particular, the following issues 
were revealed through the modelling process.  
Firstly, while the alternative standards contain a 
considerable amounts of information, we have found 
that the core aspects that differentiate between dif-
ferent types of candidate standards in terms of con-
tent and their subsequent use within a decision mak-
ing process can be distilled down to a relatively 
small number of key variables.  
Secondly, the representativeness of the test was a 
key variable to the SMEs and was important in de-
termining how much value they attributed to a given 
type of standard. In particular, there were differences 
of opinion within the team about the importance of 
certain aspects. For example, the impact of pre-
conditioning on the equipment functionality.  
Thirdly, the team agreed that the standard could 
be viewed as an insurance policy. That is, the de-
fence standard may lead to greater costs that a civil 
standard.  But a defence standard also provides a 
greater level of reassurance regarding the functional-
ity of the system.  
Finally, the process also raised the question ± ³'R
we need to quantify the model?´)RUH[DPSOHLVWKH
learning gathered through the process about the key 
issues sufficient for the Requirements Manager to 
make a decision without quantifying the model? 
Could the model be used in a qualitative manner in 
some cases? These questions have not been explored 
within the case study to date. But we suggest that 
this should be considered prior to any model quanti-
fication process.  
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
5.1 Future use of the model 
The model has been developed in order to support 
the Requirements Manager in his/her decision mak-
ing. As argued above, we believe that the qualitative 
model building process in itself helps the Require-
ments Manager think through the reasoning for dif-
ferent choices of standards.  If quantified, the model 
could also provide numerical output that might fur-
ther allow comparison of options through answering 
questions such as the following. 
 
x Which standard should be used and why? 
x :KLFK VWDQGDUG LV WKH µEHVW¶ RSWLRQ IRU PHHWLQJ
the system requirements? 
x :KDW GHILQHV µEest¶ ± is it value-for-money or 
maximise capability or minimise risk or mini-
mise cost or maximise commercial opportuni-
ties? 
x Assuming that a given standard and a system 
passes the standards test, how likely is it that the 
system does not meet MOD requirements? 
x What are the implications with respect to stand-
ards of choosing strict system requirements? 
x Under what circumstances would Standard X be a 
better choice than Standard Y? 
x How robust is Standard X to changes in future op-
erating scenario? 
x What would be the expected cost of adopting cer-
tain standards if some of uncertainties become 
fixed?  For example, the system must be interop-
erable. 
5.2  Main conclusions 
Our main findings are as follows. 
We have developed a novel approach to assessing 
the value of a standard in a practical context. Our 
approach is distinctive not only because of our con-
text but also because it differs from the existing lit-
erature on standardization which tends to be domi-
nated by principled assessments and practical 
reflections about specific standards, socio-economic 
implications of standardization more generally espe-
cially in relation to product and process innovation.    
We have found that BBN/ID models have fea-
tures that make them appealing for assessing the 
value of alternative standards. The use of graphical 
methods to support the qualitative structuring of the 
problem, enabling project teams to understand the 
impact of standard selection and for this problem 
structure to be shared quickly. This class of models 
is based upon strong mathematical foundations 
providing a theoretically robust and consistent meth-
od of combining multiple sources of information 
from different project team members. Such decision 




























Figure 1. Decision model to assess value of a standard devel-
oped for defence case study 
 
qualitative and quantitative data and information. 
Importantly, future decision-makers should be able 
to understand the justification for previous decisions, 
i.e. why a particular standard was selected.  
Our case study has demonstrated that it is feasible 
to gather the necessary qualitative information to 
structure a model for assessing the value of stand-
ards. Indeed the decision facing the project team in-
volved in the case was real and the model did pro-
vide useful feedback to the Requirements Manager. 
 The process of structuring the model in our case 
study has identified key features of the selection pro-
cess. Experience through the case suggests that often 
a decision-maker can gain sufficient insight to make 
a choice based on a qualitative reasoning and hence 
implying that a full quantitative model is not neces-
sarily required. In situations where the difference be-
tween alternative standards is considered to be neg-
ligible, then the added resource required to quantify 
the model may mean that in modelling terms, the op-
tions are equally good.  
5.3 Further Work 
There is a need to explore the potential for using 
this type of model more generally. Our case study 

































But as we acknowledged, our system under con-
sideration is comparatively small and self-contained. 
More generally there is a need to evaluate the use of 
the model for a multi-dimensional case study (i.e. 
multiple interacting systems, multiple types of 
standard). This would allow the relationships be-
tween the different dimensions to be explored and so 
determine if our proposed approach remains suitable.  
There is also a need for a proper evaluation of the 
added benefits of developing a fully quantified mod-
el in relation to a qualitative model that captures the 
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